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Performance Appraisals as Heuristic
Judgments under Uncertainty
Jochen Reb, Gary J. Greguras, Shenghua Luan,
and Michael A. Daniels
INTRODUCTION
JDM and the Performance Appraisal Process
Performance appraisals (PAs) are nearly universal in modern organizations
and influence important decisions concerning compensation, promotion,
termination and others. Typically, performance is appraised via subjective
evaluations by supervisors, peers, or self in the form of performance ratings
(Landy & Farr, 1980). We believe that this process can be fruitfully viewed
from a judgment and decision making (JDM) perspective. This perspective
highlights that raters need to search, integrate, and evaluate information
to make judgments and decisions about employees’ performance. A major
concern for researchers and practitioners alike has been that performance
ratings and actual performance are not perfectly correlated, suggesting that
raters are less than perfect in their appraisals. Why this is so can easily be
understood from a JDM perspective. This body of research suggests that
performance appraisals are judgments made under uncertainty using
heuristic processes rather than purely “cold,” analytical, perfectly rational
cognition.
Historically, judgment and decision research had a strong influence on
PA research through the famous “heuristics and biases” program and
related work in social psychology on biases in social judgment (Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This has led to many
contributions such as work on halo bias or leniency bias (for an excellent
review of this work, see Landy & Farr, 1980). Over time, interest waned
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and other research questions became more central to performance appraisal
research, partly inspired by the more social and motivational framework
proposed in Murphy and Cleveland (1995). The waning interest was also
justified by a narrow view on the part of PA researchers as well as many
behavioral decision researchers of JDM as essentially the study of biases.
However, we believe that now is a good time to reinvigorate JDM research
on PA from a broader perspective of heuristic processing that goes beyond
biases by including affect, attention, cognition, and contextual factors.
The purpose of this chapter is to present some JDM research and ideas
relevant to PA in a selective rather than comprehensive manner focusing
on areas we believe are promising for future research. We discuss these
under the sections on perception and cognition, emotions, and context and
environment. Our overarching framework is of PA as a heuristic process
under uncertainty and in the next section we discuss this framework in
more detail.
Performance Appraisal as a Heuristic Process under Uncertainty
Arguably, few concepts have had a stronger impact on the study of
judgment and decision making than Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality.
The essence of bounded rationality is captured concisely by Simon’s
“scissors” metaphor: “Human rational behavior is shaped by a scissors
whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the com -
putational capabilities of the actor” (1990, p. 7). It is out of the necessity
to cope with these two constraints that our mind has adopted various
heuristics to solve most problems (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008; Newell & Simon,
1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). On one side, heuristic processing is
faster and requires fewer attentional, cognitive, and computational
capabilities than optimization algorithms. Due to its “shortcut” nature, such
processing can lead to systematic deviations from normative standards,
resulting in the so-called “biases.” This aspect of bounded rationality has
been studied extensively in JDM under the heuristics and biases paradigm
(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002).
On the other side, task environments may differ in many aspects, such
as their levels of uncertainty and complexity and how information and goals
are structured. These differences call for a repertoire of heuristics that can
be selected flexibly for tasks with distinct features (e.g., Gigerenzer &
Selten, 2002). Although this aspect of bounded rationality has received less
attention, the study of it is essential to understand the nature and effects
of heuristic processing and we shall return to it later.
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From our perspective, PA is fundamentally similar to other JDM tasks:
Based on some relevant information of the ratee, the rater needs to either
derive a judgment on a criterion variable that can take multiple values (e.g.,
selecting one response option on a performance rating scale) or make a
decision, that is, a choice among two or more options that has concrete
consequences (e.g., promoting an employee or not). This task can be
complicated due to its uncertain nature. Specifically, facing a myriad of
information, raters may not know which pieces are relevant to the appraisal
criterion and which are not (see, for example, our discussion on the dilution
effects in performance judgment). Even if raters were able to focus on
information that is useful, it is often not clear how important each piece
of information is relative to others, and how one should utilize such
information to come up with a sound judgment or decision.
These difficulties stem in part from an uncertain environment, in which
cues (e.g., employee behaviors) are only probabilistically related to the
criterion (e.g., performance; Brehmer & Joyce, 1988), and in part from
raters who are usually limited in their skill and knowledge concerning the
rating task. Various heuristics that direct raters’ attention to some but not
all information in the environment and utilize information with some
simple but effective methods (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research
Group, 1999; Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011) are common tools
employed by decision makers in dealing with uncertainties such as those
encountered in the PA process.
In summary, PA can be viewed as a heuristic process under uncertainty.
While raters typically use heuristic processing, they may not be aware of
some of the limitations of such heuristics and the impossibility to always
make accurate performance judgments given the uncertainty involved in
this task. The next section describes some important work within a
“traditional” heuristics frame that focuses on perception and cognition.
PERCEPTION AND COGNITION IN THE
PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS
Framing Effects on Performance Judgments
It has long been recognized that how a decision is framed can have a 
huge influence on which option is chosen. Even two logically equivalent
statements (e.g., 80 percent fat-free vs. 20 percent fat) may lead to different
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decisions because of the difference in framing. An important finding in
JDM has been the difference between gain and loss framing. According to
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), options are evaluated
relative to the decision maker’s reference point such that values above the
reference point are perceived as gains whereas values below are perceived
as losses. Generally, losses are weighed more heavily and are perceived
relatively more unfavorably than gains are, a phenomenon called “loss
aversion.” Further, as objective gains or losses increase, the increase in
subjective value (i.e., perceived gain or loss) decreases (i.e., S-shape function
of the subjective value function).
Applying this idea to performance evaluations, Wong and Kwong (2005)
investigated whether employee evaluations are influenced by the framing of
the performance information. Using a scenario-based study, results indicated
that the same objective performance information was evaluated more
favorably when it was framed positively (e.g., presence rate of 97 percent)
than when it was framed negatively (e.g., absence rate of 3 percent). Results
further indicated that the performance differences between two individuals
were perceived to be larger when the performance information was express-
ed with smaller compared to larger numbers, consistent with the S-shape
function of the subjective value function. Similarly, Levin (1987) observed
that basketball players’ performances were evaluated more favorably when
participants were presented with the percentage of shots made compared 
to participants who were presented with percentage of shots missed.
Future research on framing effects and performance evaluations could
examine the boundary conditions of such effects. For example, some
research suggests that framing effects are weakened for individuals who
have strongly held beliefs or high personal involvement with respect to the
evaluated attribute (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Similarly, research
indicates that framing effects may not be observed if one has to justify the
decision to others (Miller & Fagley, 1991) or has a close relationship with
the person that the decision will affect (Wang & Johnston, 1995). In applied
settings where a manager may have high personal involvement in
appraisals, may have to justify appraisal ratings to employees, and may have
a close relationship with the employee, framing effects might be greatly
reduced or eliminated.
Decoy Effects in Performance Judgments
A famous effect that is similar to framing effects is the decoy effect. Consider
a choice between two non-dominated options (i.e., each option is better
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on at least one attribute). Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) found that
introducing a third, “decoy” option that is dominated by only one of the
original options significantly increases the frequency with which the
dominating option is chosen. This effect violates the normative principle
of regularity. For example, let us say a supervisor evaluates the performance
of three subordinates. Subordinate A produces high quantity and medium
quality work. Subordinate B produces medium quantity and high quality
work. Subordinate C (the decoy) produces high quantity and low quality
work. Subordinate C is “asymmetrically dominated” by Subordinate A,
which should increase the latter’s evaluation relative to a situation in which
only A and B are compared (e.g., Highhouse, 1996). If Subordinate C (the
decoy) produced low quantity and high quality products, Subordinate C
would now be asymmetrically dominated by Subordinate B, and B’s
performance evaluation would improve.
Numerous explanations have been offered to explain the decoy effect.
For example, Wedell and Pettibone (1996) note that the presence of a decoy
may influence the relative weighting of attributes or the subjective value
attributed to an attribute, or may add value to an alternative choice. Other
research has focused on moderating variables. For example, Slaughter,
Bagger, and Li (2006) found that the effect is stronger under pressure 
to justify the decision to others (accountability). Connolly, Reb, and 
Kausel (2010), in contrast, found that a focus on self-justification (through
increased regret salience) reduces the effect, apparently making decision
makers rely less on the shallow justification provided by the irrelevant decoy
option. Future research could examine whether and under which condi -
tions decoy options influence performance ratings as well as decisions on
whom to promote or to whom to give the largest raise.
Dilution Effects in Performance Judgments
Like decoy effects, dilution effects occur because additional informa-
tion is presented to the decision maker, which in this case leads to less 
extreme judgments (Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981). More specifically,
dilution effects occur when purely non-diagnostic information tempers,
or dilutes, the effect of diagnostic information when making judgments.
For example, a supervisor might evaluate a service employee receiving 
high customer satisfaction ratings much more positively than an employee
receiving poor customer ratings. However, when the supervisor is pro-
vided with other, non-diagnostic information (such as the type of car the
employees drives), the dilution effect suggests that the difference between
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the two performance ratings is reduced as the supervisor’s judgments
become less extreme.
Tetlock and Boettger (1989) found that the dilution effect is exacerbated
when people are held accountable for their judgments. This is interesting
given that one might expect accountability to lead to less biased decisions
(but consistent with the amplifying effect of accountability on the decoy
effect discussed above) (for an excellent review of the accountability effect,
see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Apparently, when accountability is high and
non-diagnostic information is presented, people focus more heavily on the
irrelevant information and try to make sense of it leading to diluted
(regressive) judgments (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). There is some evidence
that this may, in part, be due to conversational norms. People naturally try
to ascribe relevance to information that is presented during conversation
and thus may be likely to construe non-diagnostic information as diagnostic
(Grice, 1975). When participants were told that conversational norms
were going to be broken during the study, the effect disappeared with the
accountable subjects, though the effect persisted with the unaccountable
subjects (Tetlock, Lerner, & Boettger, 1996). This indicates that both the
conversational norm and judgmental bias explanations work to cause
dilution in judgment.
Dilution effects are important to study in the PA setting because the
rater often has a lot of non-diagnostic information concerning employees’
personal life, hobbies, interests, and background. Arguably, most of that
information will not be relevant when a manager needs to make judgments
about job performance. According to the dilution effect, that irrelevant
information would actually dilute the influence of diagnostic information,
such as performance-relevant behaviors. As a result, strong performers are
rated less positively and weak performers less negatively. This could also
have implications when the assessor has more non-diagnostic information
about some employees than others. In this case employees performing at
the same level may receive different evaluations due to the differential
influence of irrelevant information. More research is needed to understand
the mechanisms by which this phenomenon occurs in a PA context as well
as determine the utility of debiasing techniques.
Anchoring Effects in Performance Judgments
In the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, a final judgment is the result of
an initial anchor from which the judgment is adjusted (Kahneman et al.,
1982). Although the judgment and decision-making literature typically
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focuses on information that is clearly irrelevant, the PA literature typically
has focused on how potentially relevant information influences evaluations
(Thorsteinson et al., 2008). For example, this literature has investigated 
how information about an employee’s previous performance, self-ratings
or peer ratings, and other employees’ performance levels influences evalua -
tions of that employee’s current performance (e.g., Foti & Hauenstein, 
1993; Klimoski & Inks, 1990; Smither, Reilly, & Buda, 1988). More recently,
consistent with the majority of research on anchoring effects, researchers
have examined how clearly irrelevant information may influence per -
formance ratings. For example, athletes with higher numbers printed on
their jerseys were evaluated to be more likely to perform better in a future
game than were athletes with lower numbers on their jerseys (Critcher 
& Gilovich, 2008).
In the most comprehensive study to date on irrelevant anchors’ effects
on performance evaluations, Thorsteinson et al. (2008) had participants
view an example of a performance rating form that indicated either the
highest or lowest possible rating. Results indicated that the low anchor
decreased ratings and the high anchor increased ratings compared to a
control group that did not receive any anchoring information. In a follow-
up, participants viewed anchors that were more (sample evaluation of an
employee) or less (sample evaluation of a product) applicable to the
participants’ task of evaluating an employee. Results revealed a main effect
for anchoring such that high anchors produced higher ratings than the
ratings of a control group that did not receive any anchoring information,
whereas the low anchors did not differ from the control ratings. Whether
or not the anchor was relevant (i.e., product or performance anchor) did
not influence ratings. To assess the generalizability of their findings to a
field context, they asked students to evaluate their class professor late in
the semester for research purposes. Using high or low anchors on a sample
performance rating form, results indicated that the high anchor produced
higher ratings but that the low anchor did not affect ratings when compared
to a control group.
Anchoring effects frequently occur even when the anchor is completely
irrelevant, so extreme that it is implausible, or presented subliminally
(Mussweiler & Englich, 2005). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
generated an anchor by spinning a wheel of numbers and observed that
the number that the wheel stopped on (i.e., the anchor) affected subsequent
decisions in the direction of the anchor (i.e., either a high or low number).
Interestingly, anchoring effects occur for domain experts and novices alike,
regardless of whether or not the individual could recall the anchor value
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(Critcher & Gilovich, 2008), despite warnings about the biasing effects of
anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and even when participants are
offered incentives to provide accurate judgments (Kahneman et al., 1982).
Further, research suggests that two anchors with the same semantics but
different absolute values (e.g., 7300 m versus 7.3 km) produce different
effects such that anchors with larger absolute values produced larger effects
(Wong & Kwong, 2000).
According to the Selective Accessibility (SA) model of anchoring,
anchors are believed to influence judgments because the anchor increases
the accessibility of anchor-consistent knowledge about the object
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). According to the SA model, for example, when
a supervisor is exposed to an anchor and is then asked to evaluate an
employee, the supervisor assesses whether the employee is equal to the
anchor value. When making this comparison, the supervisor will access
anchor-consistent knowledge from one’s memory and rely on this inform -
ation when evaluating the employee thereby producing an assimilation
effect. It is worth noting that, although the performance appraisal literature
discusses contrast, primacy, or recency effects, anchoring effects differ
because they may result from completely irrelevant information and do not
require a comparison to another ratee.
Evaluation of Dynamic Performance
Employee performance is dynamic and changes over time (Hofmann,
Jacobs, & Gerras, 1992). Changes in employee performance occur for a
variety of reasons and may be temporary or relatively permanent. For
example, temporary performance changes may result from fluctuations in
one’s daily affective state, whereas relatively permanent changes may occur
as a result of employees learning or developing skills that are required for
effective performance. Considering both short-term and long-term changes
in performance, employee performance profiles may differ on at least three
primary characteristics: (a) performance mean, (b) performance variation,
and (c) performance trend (i.e., the trajectory of performance such as 
an improving, deteriorating, or flat trend). When faced with the task 
of providing an overall performance rating for an appraisal period, raters
must somehow integrate these dynamic features of performance into one
summary evaluation.
Reb and Cropanzano (2007) argued that, in a heuristic process, raters
draw on salient Gestalt characteristics of a dynamic performance profile
to arrive at their summary performance ratings. In a laboratory experiment
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using hypothetical dynamic performance profiles, they manipulated
performance mean, trend, and variability (within-subjects) as well as
display format, that is, whether performance information was displayed 
in tables or as graphs (between-subjects). In addition to an effect of
performance mean (i.e., higher ratings for higher mean performance), 
and consistent with predictions, results showed an effect for performance
trend such that performance ratings were most favorable for an improving
trend, followed by a flat trend, followed by a deteriorating trend (see also
DeNisi & Stevens, 1981). Interestingly, they also found that display format
moderated results consistent with the idea that ratings are influenced by
salient Gestalt characteristics: performance trend had a stronger effect
when performance information was displayed as a graph and the trend
information was most salient; performance mean had a stronger effect when
information was given in a table and average performance was more
salient. (Similarly, Lee & Dalal (2011) found a stronger effect of negative
performance extremities in the more salient graphic display condition.)
The effect of trend on evaluations of performance has been established in
both student and manager samples and in western (U.S.) and eastern
(Singapore) samples (Reb & Cropanzano, 2007; Reb & Greguras, 2010).
Future research could examine moderating conditions for this effect.
For example, Reb and Greguras (2010) found that the trend effect was
stronger when performance ratings were made for developmental purposes
as compared to administrative purposes and the reverse was true for the
effect of performance mean. They argued that this makes sense given that
trend is more relevant for developmental purposes. Future research should
also move beyond laboratory scenario studies and examine the influence
of performance dynamics on actual performance ratings over real time. A
first step in this direction was taken by Barnes, Reb and Ang (2010), who
showed that performance trend predicts compensation decision in NBA
basketball players over and above performance mean.
Decision Makers’ Hubris
As the above examples of cognitive heuristics and biases show, raters do
not perfectly assess ratee performance. Indeed, it is typically impossible
for the rater to know for sure how well an employee performed. Given the
difficulty of the task as well as the limitations to human judgment (i.e.,
bounded rationality), this imperfection is not surprising. What is surprising
is decision makers’ hubris. Despite the inherent difficulty of making
accurate judgments under uncertainty, people have been shown to exhibit
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a remarkable (over)confidence in their judgment (see Dunning, this
volume, for a more comprehensive review).
A number of factors seem to be contributing to lacking appreciation 
of making judgments under uncertainty and the resulting decision-
making hubris: judgmental miscalibration, or an inability to accurately
estimate the precision of one’s judgment (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982; Griffin &
Brenner, 2004); a tendency to seek confirmatory evidence that supports 
one’s hypotheses and to discount or filter out evidence that contradicts one’s
hypotheses (confirmation bias; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980); and
decision makers’ tendency to believe that they are capable (better-than-
average effect; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and in control (illusion of control;
Langer, 1975) and that the world is more certain than it actually is (illusion
of certainty; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). Such illusions can also
lead to an inflated view of one’s own judgment ability and can reduce raters’
reliance on decision aids, which have been shown to allow for more accurate
assessments than one’s own intuition or holistic judgment (Highhouse,
2008; Sieck & Arkes, 2005).
A few remedies have been suggested to reduce decision makers’
overconfidence: providing detailed calibration feedback and asking subjects
to reflect on and process that feedback (Sieck & Arkes, 2005), making people
aware of the pervasiveness of overconfidence (McGraw, Mellers, & Ritov,
2004), and asking participants to specifically generate reasons that support
the alternative hypothesis (Hoch, 1985). However, there is some evidence
that the latter tactic could actually entrench the participants’ confidence if
few alternative views are accessed (due to the availability heuristic; Fox,
2006). Research should examine in more detail how raters can avoid hubris
and become more aware of the limitation of their performance ratings.
EMOTIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
PROCESS
Analytical vs. Emotional Decision Making
Research on the role of emotion in judgment and decision-making
processes is a relatively recent contribution to the literature. Historically,
decision making was seen as a purely cognitive, analytical endeavor and
JDM research focused on discovering and explaining cognitive heuristics
and biases (Kahneman et al., 1982). Current theory and empirical work
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has shifted to include emotion as part of decision processes and out-
comes. This shift seems particularly relevant for the PA context as
evaluating performance is an inherently affective-laden process. For
example, supervisors may experience emotions such as anxiety, regret, or
guilt as part of the PA process, whereas employees may similarly experience
emotions such as worry, anger, and frustration.
The role of emotions in the decision-making process is compellingly
illustrated in the work of neurologist Antonio Damasio and colleagues.
Damasio studied patients who had damaged the part of the brain that is
responsible for the experience of emotions. Even though all other brain
regions were intact and the people were otherwise fully functioning, they
were unable to make intelligent decisions that served their own interests
(Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990). Thus, while the decision-making
process may appear to be fully cognitive in nature, it appears that emotions
are crucial in moving us toward the best option or judgment.
Damasio (1994) argues that over time we learn to associate certain
stimuli with affective states, called somatic markers. Sometimes, cognitively
weighing the pros and cons of the individual attributes of stimuli becomes
computationally cumbersome (e.g., when an assessor is too busy to process
and evaluate an observed behavior of a subordinate). In this case, he/she
may quickly call up a particular somatic marker from previous experience
that will evoke a positive or negative emotion (e.g., frustration), which will
then guide behavior (e.g., make a negative evaluation of that employee)
and ease the cognitive load. This pool of somatic markers used to short-
cut more algorithmic information processing is called the affect heuristic
(Slovic et al., 2002).
A complementary account of affective processes in cognitive reasoning
distinguishes System 1 from System 2 processing (Kahneman, 2003;
Stanovich & West, 2000). The former is characterized by fast, heuristic-
based, emotional processing and is generally social and personal in nature.
The latter is characterized by slower, controlled, analytic processing and
is less social and less contextualized. Because System 2 processing is much
more effortful, people typically rely on System 1 processing despite its
potentially biased processing. Thus, judgments and decisions tend to be
the result of System 1 processing unless both motivation and available
resources are present to allow System 2 processing to override System 1.
It stands to reason that System 1 processes have significant influence 
on performance evaluations. Raters often are occupied by a variety of 
tasks, limiting the amount of attentional and cognitive resources available
for making performance judgments. Also, the multiple complex stimuli
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common in organizational settings favor System 1 processing because it is
quicker and less effortful.
Anticipated Emotions in the Appraisal Process
Baumeister and colleagues (2007) argued that decisions are guided by
anticipated emotion and that without the anticipation of emotions,
particularly regret, people are more likely to make poor decisions that they
will later feel sorry about. Gilbert and Wilson (2007) have called the pro-
cess of anticipating emotions “pre-feeling” and have argued that it is similar
to (but less intensive than) the experience of actual emotion. One antici-
pated emotion that has received particular attention is anticipated regret
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Because regret is an aversive emotion evoked
by a bad decision, people are motivated to avoid it. Regret avoidance has
been found in practical domains such as negotiation (Larrick & Boles,
1995), consumer behavior (Simonson, 1992), and sexual behavior (Richard,
de Vries, & van der Pligt, 1998), and in laboratory gambling tasks (Reb &
Connolly, 2010).
Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002) have argued for two components of
regret. A first component, outcome regret, is associated with the evaluation
of the outcome resulting from one’s choice as worse than some reference
standard such as the actual or imagined outcome of a foregone option. A
second component, self-blame regret, is associated with a judgment that
one made an unjustified decision—for example, that one decided hastily
or used poor information. Considerable evidence supports the idea of self-
blame regret. For example, Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) found in a series
of studies that intention-behavior inconsistency can increase experienced
regret over a bad outcome. They also found that self-reported amount of
thinking about the decision, an indicator of decision process carefulness,
was negatively related to experienced regret. Further, Reb and Connolly
(2010) provided evidence for a mediating role of justifiability perceptions
in the effect of self-blame regret.
Applying these ideas to the PA context, one can wonder whether raters
will be influenced by any anticipated emotions they might experience
during the PA process. For example, raters might anticipate regret or guilt
for providing low ratings, thereby negatively affecting ratee outcomes (e.g.,
bonus, promotion). At the same time, raters might anticipate regret and
self-blame for unduly favorable ratings that are unfair relative to the
evaluations of other employees. The balance of these two anticipated regrets
may determine the location of the final rating on a rating scale. Another
24 • Jochen Reb et al.
interesting question is what will happen when emotions such as regret are
particularly salient during the appraisal process. Research suggests that
increasing the salience (explicitly or implicitly) of self-blame regret can lead
to more careful, justifiable decision processes (Reb, 2008; Reb & Connolly,
2010). This suggests that prompting raters to anticipate the self-blame and
regret they might experience as a result of giving a wrong rating might lead
to more careful, accurate ratings.
Experienced Emotions in the Appraisal Process
Emotions are not only influential as anticipated consequences in the
performance appraisal process, but also influence the process itself. The
Affect Infusion Model is a promising theory of how affect influences our
behaviors and judgments (Forgas, 1995; Forgas & George, 2001). This
model proposes that affective states are more likely to influence judgment
when the task is complex and requires substantial processing than when
it is relatively straightforward. This is because when judgment is difficult
to make, the assessor searches pre-existing knowledge and experiences,
which are emotion-laden, to help make a decision. Also, when the judgment
is not straightforward (e.g., the assessor has not had much experience with
the employee), the assessor relies on more constructive and generative
processes that are likely to utilize affective structures.
So, how do experienced emotions affect the performance judgment
process? The affect-as-information hypothesis states that experienced affect
assigns value to whatever is interpreted as the cause of that affect (e.g., Clore,
1992). This affect is then interpreted as useful information about how one
feels about the object of judgment (e.g., the performance of an employee).
As previously mentioned, this affect heuristic is fast and powerful in terms
of its effect on judgment. One important aspect of this phenomenon is that
when the person is aware of an emotion that was caused by something other
than the judgment task, it is unlikely to affect the judgment much. However,
if the cause of the emotion is ambiguous, it may erroneously be used as
information in the judgment task (Kadous, 2001). Thus, a rater who is, for
unknown reasons, in a bad mood may attribute this mood to information
about the performance of the employee and as a result give a more negative
performance rating.
Emotions and moods can also affect which memories are recalled 
while making performance judgments (see Rusting, 1998, for a review).
This mood-congruency hypothesis states that the assessor is more likely
to recall past events that are congruent with his/her current mood. Thus,
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a rater with a positively valenced mood is more likely to recall employee
behavior that also elicited positive feelings at the time (Sinclair, 1988).
Interestingly, interpersonal affect (a like–dislike relationship between rater
and ratee) rather than mood has been found to influence the recall and
weighting of congruent performance information (Robbins & DeNisi,
1998). This is because a long affective history that exists between two people
is likely to be more salient than a transient mood state. Additionally, this
effect has been shown to be stronger for upward and peer ratings rather
than top-down assessments. The reason for this is because raters in these
cases typically have less experience in making performance judgments 
of others and are also less accountable for those judgments (Antonioni &
Park, 2001).
Felt emotions in the performance appraisal process can also affect the
depth of information processing used by the rater (Schwarz, 1990). More
specifically, negative emotions tend to lead to more in-depth processing
of information compared to positive emotions. This is because negative
emotions are a signal that something is wrong and requires more attention.
Positive emotions indicate that all is well and are more likely to promote
the use of heuristics so that attention can be allocated elsewhere.
Example: Escalation of Commitment
Escalation of commitment refers to the allocation of additional resources
(e.g., time, money) to a failing project (Staw, 1976). Escalation of commit -
ment can be considered irrational because these additional resources are
unlikely to result in a successful project (“throwing good money after bad”).
Several explanations have been proposed to explain decision makers’
escalation of commitment, for example: (a) self-justification—individuals
want to be viewed favorably and therefore these additional resources 
justify their prior decisions (Staw, 1976), (b) closing costs—individuals are
willing to accept risks in an attempt to avoid the sure loss of resources 
by quitting the project (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), and (c) norm for
consistency—individuals prefer to appear consistent in their support for 
a project or in their beliefs that the project will succeed (Staw & Ross, 
1980).
Although most demonstrations of escalation of commitment involve
allocating additional financial resources to a failing project, this phenom -
enon has also been observed in a PA context. For example, Slaughter and
Greguras (2009) found a positive escalation effect, that is, more favorable
performance evaluations from raters initially responsible for hiring the
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employee than from raters not involved in the hiring decision. However,
they found no negative escalation effect, that is, no worse ratings for raters
who had initially recommended not hiring the employee. Extending these
studies, recent research has investigated the role that emotions might play
in influencing one’s escalation of commitment when evaluating employee
performance.
Wong, Yik, and Kwong (2006) examined the role of negative affect in
escalating decisions. Participants were informed that they were or were not
responsible for the hiring of a certain employee who was now performing
poorly. Trait negative affect and whether one was responsible for hiring
the employee interacted to predict performance ratings such that the
relationship between negative affect and performance ratings was strongly
negative in the responsible condition but not significant in the not
responsible condition. Wong et al. (2006) argued that individuals with high
negative affect are more likely to withdraw from stressful situations (e.g.,
receiving negative feedback that the employee they chose is performing
poorly) in order to reduce unpleasant feelings, and therefore they are less
likely to escalate commitment to a failing and stressful project than
individuals lower on negative affect.
Research also demonstrates that other emotions or anticipated emo-
tions influence one’s escalation of commitment. For example, Tsai and
Young (2010) examined how fear and anger may influence escalation of
commitment. Tsai and Young argued that anger is associated with a sense
of control (optimism), whereas fear is associated with a sense of lack of
control (pessimism). Consistent with their hypotheses, participants in the
fear-induced condition perceived their hiring decision as being more risky
(pessimism) than participants in the anger-induced condition (optimism).
Further, risk perception mediated the relationships between emotion (fear
or anger) and escalation such that risk perception negatively predicted
escalation of commitment in the form of performance ratings. Other
research on escalation of commitment and emotions (but not necessarily
in a performance appraisal context) has observed, for example, that
anticipating positive emotions if the project succeeds positively relates to
escalation of commitment (Harvey & Victravich, 2009), that experiencing
regret from escalating in one situation can decrease escalation in a different
context (Ku, 2008), and that anticipating experiencing regret for quitting
a project positively predicts the amount that one escalates (Wong & Kwong,
2007).
O’Neill (2009) extended the above studies by examining how the
expressions of anger and guilt by others in one’s workplace might influence
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escalation of commitment. O’Neill reasoned that employees learn appro -
priate emotional expressions from their coworkers. If one’s coworkers
frequently express anger, O’Neill hypothesized that individuals will be 
more likely to escalate commitment because they may wish to avoid the
consequences of angry coworkers if one admits to making a bad initial
decision. In contrast, individuals will be less likely to escalate commitment
when coworkers frequently express guilt because guilt is an expression 
that something went wrong and that it is acceptable to admit mistakes to
one’s coworkers. Results from two of her three studies supported these
hypotheses.
CONTEXTUAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES
Culture as Moderator of Performance Judgments
The increasing diversity of the global workforce adds another layer of
influence on interpersonal and group dynamics in the workplace (Triandis,
Kurowski, & Gelfand, 1994). A particularly salient source of diversity in
the modern workplace is national culture, yet there has been surprisingly
little research on the effects of culture on performance appraisal processes
(Fletcher & Perry, 2001). The scant literature that exists is primarily
descriptive and fails to examine the underlying processes that cause
differences in judgment and behavior. Because of this, the performance
appraisal literature has been criticized for lacking generalizability to cultures
outside the U.S. and Northwestern Europe (e.g., Triandis, 1999). Some work
has looked at the effects of culture on general decision-making styles,
which is a step in the right direction. Weber, Ames, and Blais (2004) devel -
oped a culturally differentiated taxonomy of decision-making “modes,” or
preferences in the ways people arrive at decisions. For example, they found
that the Chinese are less inclined to use analytical/calculation-based
reasoning at coming to decisions than Americans. More research is needed,
however, to determine how these modes of decision making affect the
performance appraisal process cross-culturally.
In the performance appraisal context, Li and Karakowsky (2001) found
culture to affect PA accuracy in samples of Asian- and Caucasian-
Americans. They found that when an observer views behavior as
undesirable, based on cultural values, that behavior becomes more salient
28 • Jochen Reb et al.
and is given more weight in overall performance judgments. For example,
a rater from a culture that values high power distance would be more
sensitive to undesirable behaviors such as insubordination or showing a
lack of respect to superiors. This has important implications from a JDM
perspective because multiple observers may rate the same behavior
differently depending on their cultural lenses. Thus, the criteria used for
assessing rater accuracy should be considered in the cultural context of
both the rater and ratee.
Some work in social psychology has also looked at appraisal processes
in general from a cross-cultural perspective. Morris and Peng (1994) found
that the Americans and Chinese have different attribution styles, which is
likely to differentially affect performance judgments. They found that 
the American sample was much more susceptible to the fundamental
attribution error (the under-attribution of others’ behavior to contextual
or situational factors) than the Chinese sample. This is likely due to the
American individualistic value that places less emphasis on the social-
relational aspects of behavior than the Chinese collectivist values.
One cultural difference that may affect performance appraisals is that
of lay theories of change. North Americans tend to hold the view that 
things remain stable over time and that rates of change are fairly con -
tinuous, whereas Eastern cultures (particularly Chinese) expect trajectories
to change or even reverse with time (Ji, 2008). This is likely the result of a
difference in temporal focus, with westerners focusing more on the present
and easterners focusing more on the future and past (Ji et al., 2009).
Surprisingly, there has been very little research as to how these differences
might affect performance appraisals. For example, it is possible that
someone with a more cyclical or variable theory of change might be better
able to perceive changes in performance over time. Someone with a more
stable theory of change might be more susceptible to the confirmation bias
as they are less likely to perceive disconfirming informa tion as indicative
of a change in employee performance. It could also be that those with 
a variable theory of change are more influenced by past behavior than
current behavior, which could bias performance judgments. More work is
needed in this area.
Finally, there has also been some research that has looked at the effects
of culture on appraisal mechanisms from the ratee perspective. Brockner
and Chen (1996) analyzed culture as a moderator of the relationship
between self-esteem and self-protection after a threat to the self. In a U.S.
sample (with more independent self-construal) this relationship held, but
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in a Chinese sample (with more interdependent self-construal), it did not.
Thus, cultural values seem also to affect how people construe and respond
to negative feedback. More research is needed in this area to better
understand how culture also affects the ratee to maximize the benefits of
feedback interventions.
Ecological Rationality of Performance Appraisal Heuristics
Recall that the structure of task environments and limitation of our
cognitive capacities are the two “blades” in Simon’s scissors metaphor.
Whereas the latter has been studied extensively in JDM, especially by the
heuristics and biases program (e.g., Gilovich et al., 2002; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), the former did not receive much attention until
Gigerenzer and colleagues started their ecological rationality program
more recently (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999). The core of the program, as
its name suggests, is to understand the environment or ecology under which
a cognitive task is undertaken and how different strategies—optimization
models or heuristics—should be selected to maximize their fit to the task
ecology.
The spirit of the program is exemplified by the “take-the-best” heuristic.
Take-the-best is a heuristic designed for the paired-comparison tasks in
which one needs to infer which option of a pair has a larger criterion value
(e.g., which employee of two has better managerial potential). Its algorithm
is simple: It searches cues related to the criterion (e.g., employees’
personalities, education, past performance, etc.) in the order of their
predictive validities and stops searching whenever there is a difference
between the two options on a cue. A decision is then made in favor of the
option that has a larger value on the stopping cue. This simple heuristic
has been shown to perform remarkably well against other, more complex
strategies (e.g., Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999). However, this
is more so in environments where cues differ largely in their validities, but
less in environments where cue validities are rather close (e.g., Martignon
& Hoffrage, 2002). In addition, take-the-best is a heuristic designed
specifically for one type of tasks: paired-comparison. For other tasks, such
as judgment of a continuous variable’s value or choice among multiple
options with varied feature values, other heuristics or strategies must be
applied in its place (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008). The multiplicity of heuristics
in the face of the complexity of task ecologies is summarized by the
“toolbox” metaphor: The mind is like a handyman who likes to carry a
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toolbox at work; depending on the task at hand, either a hammer or a
screwdriver is applied to maximize the job efficiency but seldom both (e.g.,
Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002).
What can we learn from the ideas of ecological rationality in the study
of performance appraisal? First, it would be interesting to know what tools
are placed in the appraisal toolbox. A rich set of heuristics, fast-and-frugal
or quick-and-dirty, that have already been studied widely in the JDM
community may serve as possible starters. Second, knowing the tools, the
next step would be to study structures of different task ecologies. Besides
the informational structure that is emphasized by the ecological rationality
program (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999), cultural, social, and organizational
structures should be critical in the context of performance appraisal, as
well. Third, a claim made frequently by the ecological rationality program
is that simple heuristics can often achieve as high levels of performance as
optimization models (e.g., multiple regression and Bayesian models). Some
approaches not entirely familiar to the management community, such as
computer simulations and model comparison techniques based on models’
predictive but not fitting performance, have been used to support this claim
(e.g., Luan et al., 2011). Adopted to study the workings of performance
appraisal heuristics, these approaches could facilitate our understanding
of the heuristics in both descriptive- and prescriptive-oriented research.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Much too often, there has been an unfortunate equating of judgment and
decision making with “cognitive heuristics and biases.” This equating is
unfortunate because it limits the contribution a JDM perspective can make
to our understanding of the performance appraisal process. From our
perspective, a decision can be thought of as a bottleneck into which a variety
of factors, such as personality, values, beliefs, judgments, and preferences,
are condensed through the decision process (see Reb, 2010). Thus, a JDM
perspective can be useful in advancing theory-based, process-oriented
research. Importantly, such a perspective is not limited to studying
cognition but can integrate other factors, such as affect, culture, and
context, as we have shown above. We hope that our chapter contributes
to such a broader understanding of JDM and more research in this
direction.
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